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Prospects for Settlement of the Israeli-Arab
Conflict
NOAM CHOMSKY*
These remarks will be rather narrowly focussed. I will not con-
sider questions of right and justice or the merits of conflicting claims,
but will concentrate on the likely consequences of proposed policies
and programs. Secondly, I will limit attention to only one of the many
problems of the region, the Israeli-Arab conflict.
For some time, the United States government has been commit-
ted to an "incremental" approach that seeks to reduce the short-run
likelihood of conflict between the major military powers: primarily,
Israel and Egypt; secondarily, Israel and Syria. Within this frame-
work, priority is assigned to separation-of-forces agreements and
other measures to reduce tension. The approach has had some limited
success and may lead to more far-reaching arrangements, despite the
present stalemate, since it conforms to the immediate needs of the
belligerent states and the United States. Nevertheless, I believe that
this policy is short-sighted and fraught with danger. To see why this
is so, let us consider the likely consequences of success in the current
negotiating efforts.
Let us assume that arrangements are reached between Egypt
and Israel that leave Israel in control of (1) the "inner territories,"
namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; (2) areas in the Golan
Heights and the Sinai to which Syria and Egypt, respectively, will
surely not renounce their claims. For the tenure of this hypothesized
agreement, there will be no military conflict. Let us assume further
that the agreement contributes as intended to reduction of the short-
run probability of war. What is likely to ensue? Specifically, how is
the Government of Israel likely to act under these circumstances,
with regard to the occupied territories (1) and (2)?
There are three kinds of evidence that bear on this question:
statements by government officials and other political spokesmen;
actions currently in progress and plans now formulated for implemen-
tation; the record of recent history. Evidence of these categories con-
verges: there is every reason to suppose that Israel will continue its
programs of development in the occupied territories, leading to inte-
gration and some form of annexation.
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The political leadership has been consistent and explicit on this
score. The present government, like its predecessor, has repeatedly
confirmed-not, to be sure, in official pronouncements, but in state-
ments by high officials-that Israel will not retreat from (i) the Gaza
Strip, (ii) the Golan Heights, (iii) Northeastern Sinai, (iv) Sharm el-
Sheikh and an access to it, and (v) much of the West Bank, including
a considerably expanded Jerusalem, the settlements of the Jordan
valley, and unspecified other regions. Responding to Hussein's pro-
posal for a Jordanian federation including the West Bank in March
1972, the Israeli Parliament declared that "(T)he Knesset has deter-
mined that the historic right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel
is beyond challenge;" the "Land of Israel" is understood as including
the West Bank. The Jordan is regarded as Israel's "security border,"
implying at least Israeli military control over the West Bank, though
some other form of "sovereignty" may be permitted, indeed, wel-
comed, since it will overcome what is called in Israel "the demo-
graphic problem," that is, the problem posed by the presence of
Arabs within the Jewish State. The governing party recently an-
nounced that Northeastern Sinai bordering the Gaza Strip must
remain "within the Israeli map," along with the Gaza Strip and the
Golan Heights and the access to Sharm el-Sheikh.1 These programs,
which have wide popular support within Israel, preclude any long-
term settlement with Egypt, Syria, or the Palestinians.
Furthermore, in all of the regions mentioned substantial and
long-term development programs are in progress or in the planning
stages. The budget for development in these regions has been ex-
panded for the current fiscal year, indicating Israel's commitment to
these projects despite its severe economic straits. By any reasonable
measure, investment for development projects is higher in the occu-
pied areas than within the "green line" (the pre-June 1967 borders).
In the 1975-6 budget, it amounts to IL. 1.7 million per family. These
programs will, of course, create political barriers to any withdrawal,
and it must be assumed are undertaken with this consequence in
mind. These projects extend-more precisely, accelerate-the pre-
October 1973 developments, which culminated in the August 1973
electoral program of the governing party, virtually a program for
eventual annexation, and so understood both within Israel and in the
Arab states.
3
1. Cf. David Lancashire, Associated Press, Boston Globe, June 20, 1975; N.Y.
Times, June 20, 1975, at 9, col. 7; Yuval Elizur, Washington Post, June 21, 1975.
2. For some details, see Darin-Drabkin, The Economic Aspects of Defense, NEW
OUTLOOK: MID. EAST MONTHLY 51 (Mar.-Apr. 1975).




The intention to develop and slowly integrate the territories cited
is clearly understood within Israel, as are the political consequences
of such a decision. The leading Israeli newspaper, the independent
Ha'aretz, comments editorially that:
it is important for Israel to remember that the difference between Wash-
ington's and Moscow's attitudes concerning an overall agreement is small
... . Although from Israel's viewpoint, the two super-powers' attitudes
are exceedingly remote from hers in this matter .... Concerning the
central issue of borders, Israel will need to conduct a political battle at
Geneva, not just against the Arab countries and the Soviet Union but also
against the United States.'
The problem is that both the Soviet Union and the United States are
committed, formally at least, to a settlement along the lines of the
various United Nations Resolutions, while Israel intends to maintain
its control over the territories cited. Hence the "political battle" fore-
seen if the Geneva conference is ever convened.
Reduction of the probability of military conflict will, in the eyes
of the Israeli leadership, restore the essential features of the situation
prevailing prior to October 1973, when the risk of war was considered
negligible. As their statements and actions clearly indicate, they will
proceed with the programs of that period, now accelerated, with the
intention of "building facts" in the occupied territories that they
expect to retain.
The official position of the government of Israel is that there can
be no Palestinian state, but only two states (Israel and Jordan-
Palestine) within the former Palestine (plus whatever areas Israel
intends to retain outside of this region; at the very least, the Golan
Heights and Northeastern Sinai). The question arises: why should
Israel so adamantly refuse to consider the possibility of a Palestinian
state in the region from which it eventually withdraws? The grounds
offered are "security," but it is difficult to take this argument very
seriously. Suppose that Israel were to withdraw from a region suffi-
cient for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the inner
territories. On this hypothesis, consider two alternatives: (1) a Pales-
tinian state is established within this region; (2) the region reverts to
Jordanian rule. It is obvious that situation (2) is far more dangerous
for Israel. A Jordan-Palestine incorporating some substantial part of
the inner territories would pose a far greater military threat to Israel
than a Palestinian state in this region, contained within the Israel-
Jordan alliance and existing at the sufferance of its more power-
ful-and, it is to be expected, watchful and even hostile neighbors.
Jordan-Palestine will have a measure of independence and military
4. HA'ARETZ, April 14, 1975. Lengthy excerpts appear in Israleft News Service, No.
61, May 4, 1975, P.O.B. 9013, Jerusalem.
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power that a Palestinian state will never attain. Furthermore, as the
most dynamic, educated and numerous element within the projected
Jordan-Palestine, the Palestinians may be expected, sooner or later,
to gain control over this state; it is striking that right-wing Israeli
advocates of the "Jordanian solution" have often proposed exactly
this. If, as assumed, Palestinian hostility is a serious and dangerous
problem, solution (2) maximizes the threat. Thus Israel's advocacy
of a Jordan-Palestine, as distinct from a Palestinian mini-state
within the inner territories, seems paradoxical.
The paradox is resolved as soon as we recognize that a Pales-
tinian state, however small, would have to be granted some region
within the inner territories that would not remain under Israeli mili-
tary occupation. But Israel has no intention of relinquishing military
control over any such region. It is the hypothesis of the preceding
paragraph that the Israeli leadership rejects. Its advocacy of (2) and
rejection of (1) merely serves to demonstrate, once again, that Israel
intends to retain control over the inner territories, along with the
others mentioned earlier.
As noted, Israel might agree to have some part of the West Bank
placed under local or Jordanian administration, while remaining
under Israeli military control. In fact, explicit proposals of this char-
acter have been put forth. This is the essence of the "Allon plan," so
far, the least expansionist program even discussed by anyone close to
power. Furthermore, it seems that proposals to this effect have been
made secretly to Jordan, but rejected.5 More than this is not contem-
plated. For this reason, it is impossible for Israel to consider the
possibility of a Palestinian state, even though it would hardly be more
than a protectorate of Israel and its Jordanian ally. Note that Jordan
may be expected to remain an ally (tacit, to be sure) of Israel, under
the American aegis, if a Palestinian state is established in which
Palestinian nationalist energies will be contained.
For similar reasons, Israel has refused to permit any political
activity or organization within the occupied territories. In 1967, the
military commander of the West Bank, General Haim Herzog, pro-
posed to the Government that right-wing Palestinian groups be en-
couraged in these territories as a counter to the PLO. Even this re-
quest was refused, and government censorship prevented Herzog
from making his suggestion public.6 Under the present Rabin govern-
ment, the repression in the West Bank has been significantly intensi-
fied. The immediate cause is that any relaxation leads to expression
5. Cf. General (Reserve) Mattityahu Peled, The imagination is Dwarfed by the
Reality, Ma'ariv, August 9, 1974.
6. See his statement in EMDA (December 1974).
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of support for the PLO. But the real point is that no independent
Palestinian voice can be tolerated in these regions, for the reasons
already explained.
Let us now return to our initial hypothesis: that the incremental
approach achieves some success. Under the assumed conditions, Is-
rael will persist in its programs of development and integration, as
just outlined. One consequence will be an increase in Palestinian
terrorism, since there will be no alternative for the Palestinians short
of national suicide. Israel will undoubtedly intensify its "retaliatory"
actions in Lebanon. The repression within the occupied territories
and the expulsion of Bedouins in Northeastern Sinai will continue.
Hostility between Israel and the Arab States will persist as well.
Whatever the private wishes of the leadership of the Arab States,
they cannot openly accede to the destruction of Palestinian national-
ism or the permanent occupation of territories of the Arab States.
The arms race, already a crushing burden for Israel, will intensify,
spurred by the insatiable need of the international arms producers
(the United States far in the lead) to recycle petrodollars, and the
perceived self-interest of the rulers of the oil-producing states. Israel
cannot possibly match the resources of its potential enemies, but it
can also not fall far behind in the competition. Israel's overwhelming
military victory in 1967 significantly increased its security problems
as well as its military budget. The problems will only grow under the
conditions we are assuming. Even in the absence of war, the domestic
consequences within Israel will be severe, both social and economic.
The economic crisis will worsen. Emigration of the skilled and edu-
cated will probably continue, as in the past year, while immigration
and investment will continue to decline. The Arab economic boycott
may be expected to be far more effective with the shift of economic
power to the oil producers. Similarly, Egypt will be unable to face its
desperate social and economic crisis under the conditions of prepara-
tion for war, and internal disorder may erupt with unpredictable
consequences.
Eventually, there will probably be a war, as virtually all analysts
on all sides anticipate, at a level of armaments far higher than before.
Until now, Israel's urban concentrations have been spared, though in
Egypt in 1970 and Syria in 1973 civilian targets were subjected to
heavy bombardment. In the next war, Israel is unlikely to remain
immune in this regard. Given the level of armaments and the inter-
ests of the major powers in the nearby oil-producing regions, the war
may escalate to a serious international conflict, which the local par-
ticipants (not to speak of others) will be lucky to survive.
1975
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These are the likely consequences of success in the current "in-
cremental" negotiations. The likely consequences of failure are sim-
ply that the process outlined will be accelerated. For these reasons,
the current debate over who is to blame for the failure of Kissinger's
"shuttle diplomacy" is an exercise in futility and irrelevance.
Whether the negotiations succeed or fail hardly matters. The whole
framework is a prescription for disaster.
While naturally one can only speculate about these matters-we
are discussing politics, not physics-the preceding analysis seems to
me rather plausible, and perhaps compelling. If so, the question natu-
rally arises whether there is another framework, more favorable to the
interests of the local parties and others concerned with the affairs of
the region. There is, I think, a far better framework, one that offers
some hope of a peaceful settlement. The alternative framework places
emphasis on the fundamental political issue rather than the military
confrontation. That is, priority will be assigned not to the military
confrontation between Israel. and Egypt (and secondarily, Israel and
Syria), but to the conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian
Arabs, the two national groups that claim national rights in a single
territory. In terms of military power or social organization, there is
no comparison, of course, between these two opponents. Neverthe-
less, their conflict is at the heart of the problem. As long as it is not
resolved, other problems will not be put to rest. The conflict will
simmer and threaten to erupt in a major conflagration. If their con-
flict is resolved, it is quite possible that other pieces of the puzzle will
fall into place.
Prior to October 1973, various solutions might have been imag-
ined for this local conflict. Now, there is really only one. Israel must
relinquish the inner territories, with perhaps minor territorial adjust-
ments, along the lines of the Rogers Plan and U.N. Resolution 242 of
November 1967, as generally understood throughout the world. But
these plans, which offered nothing to the Palestinians, were unjust at
the time and entirely unfeasible now. The areas relinquished must be
assigned to the control of the Palestinians, those who live there now
and those in the Palestinian diaspora. There is very little doubt that
their decision will be to form a Palestinian state and that this state
will be organized by the PLO. The two states-Israel and Pales-
tine-must reach agreement on a peace treaty within a regional set-
tlement in which the other presently occupied areas will revert to
Egypt and Syria, with demilitarized zones, perhaps an international
peace-keeping force on both sides of the border (not only on the Arab
side, as before 1967), serious efforts to reduce the level of armaments,
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and moves toward cooperative regional arrangements. As for Jerusa-
lem, the most reasonable suggestion would seem to be for it to serve
as the joint capital, a unified open city.
The great powers have much incentive to try to reduce the likeli-
hood of conflict and should therefore be able to find ways to work
together to enhance such a solution. There is good reason to suppose
that Egypt will welcome such a settlement, as it has indicated for
several years. The same is true of the oil-producing states of the
Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, and perhaps Syria. The Soviet Union has
long advocated such a solution, and it is not inconsistent with official
American policy, at least prior to 1970, when the Rogers Plan was
tacitly abandoned in favor of support for de facto Israeli annexation
of the occupied territories, as Kissinger took control of Middle East
policy. The United States, however, has no commitment to this "Kis-
singer plan" of the pre-October 1973 period; it was predicated on the
assumption that Israel's military hegemony was beyond challenge
and that its economic and technical advantages would if anything
increase. The plan will be abandoned if it is seen to conflict with the
fundamental American interest: to ensure that the United States
maintains its control over the distribution of Middle East oil. Israel
fears that the superpowers may converge on such a program, as the
editorial comment cited earlier indicates.'
For the Palestinians, such an outcome will be a bitter disap-
pointment, but there is no realistic alternative for them. There are
some indications-though no official statement-that they will reluc-
tantly accept such a settlement.
A settlement along these lines seems feasible. It offers no guaran-
tee of long-range peace and security for any of the parties con-
cerned-and we must recall a point often overlooked: the Arab States
surrounding Israel also have a security problem, and the "security
problem" of the Palestinians is incomparably more severe than that
of any of the other parties. There are no guarantees in this world. Talk
of "iron-clad guarantees" is simply shorthand for refusal to negotiate.
The great powers, whatever they may promise, will act in the per-
ceived self-interest of dominant groups. The United Nations will be
free to act insofar as the superpowers permit it to do so. International
law will be interpreted by the great powers in ways conducive to their
perceived interests, as when the United States invades South Viet-
nam or the Dominican Republic or when the Soviet Union invades
Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Surely, no rational person will have illu-
sions on this score.
7. Supra note 4.
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But the fact remains that a settlement of the sort outlined is in
the interest of the superpowers, the surrounding Arab States, and
even Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, much as they may resist it.
For the present, it seems that Israel's objections pose the primary
barrier to any such settlement. Given its present policies Israel's long-
term prospects for healthy existence or even survival are dim. Never-
theless, for the present Israel is the dominant military power in the
region. Its refusal to come to terms with the Palestinians-and it
must be emphasized that under present conditions, that means the
PLO-will bar the way to any settlement and will lead, very possibly,
to the grim outcome sketched earlier. Israel's only hope for decent
survival lies in a political settlement with the Palestinians and its
gradual integration into the region, in some evolving pattern of coop-
eration.
It is quite natural that Israeli Jews should fear their neighbors
and trust only in their military strength. But they must come to
understand that the basis for decent survival lies in accommoda-
tion, and that the risks that must be taken as they move towards
such an accommodation are considerably smaller than the risks of
continued military confrontation. Israel's military victory of 1967
will prove to have been a disaster for the Jewish community unless
those groups within Israel that appreciate and understand these
facts gain in influence and political power. Those who are concerned
for the fate of Israel and its people should, in my opinion, lend such
support as they can to such groups, and should refrain from strength-
ening those elements, now dominant, that are committed to occupa-
tion and military confrontation.
For Israel, it would be far better for a political settlement to arise
from its own initiatives. Alternatively, it may simply be imposed by
the great powers, a far less favorable outcome as far as Israel is con-
cerned. It is particularly important to emphasize these points in the
United States. American support for the most intransigent and ex-
pansionist elements within Israel contributed to the near disaster of
1973, and is likely to have still more bitter consequences in the future.
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